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As electronic communications become more prevalent, mobile and universal, the threats of data compromises also accordingly
loom larger. In the context of a body sensor network (BSN), which permits pervasive monitoring of potentially sensitive medical
data, security and privacy concerns are particularly important. It is a challenge to implement traditional security infrastructures
in these types of lightweight networks since they are by design limited in both computational and communication resources. A
key enabling technology for secure communications in BSN’s has emerged to be biometrics. In this work, we present two comple-
mentary approaches which exploit physiological signals to address security issues: (1) a resource-eﬃcient key management system
for generating and distributing cryptographic keys to constituent sensors in a BSN; (2) a novel data scrambling method, based on
interpolation and random sampling, that is envisioned as a potential alternative to conventional symmetric encryption algorithms
for certain types of data. The former targets the resource constraints in BSN’s, while the latter addresses the fuzzy variability of
biometric signals, which has largely precluded the direct application of conventional encryption. Using electrocardiogram (ECG)
signals as biometrics, the resulting computer simulations demonstrate the feasibility and eﬃcacy of these methods for delivering
secure communications in BSN’s.
Copyright © 2008 F. M. Bui and D. Hatzinakos. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Security is a prime concern of the modern society. From
a local house-hold setting to a more global scope, ensur-
ing a safe and secure environment is a critical goal in to-
day’s increasingly interconnected world. However, there are
still outstanding obstacles that have prevented the realization
of this objective in practical scenarios, despite many tech-
nological advances. Recently, body sensor networks (BSNs)
have shown the potential to deliver promising security ap-
plications [1–3]. Representing a fast-growing convergence of
technologies in medical instrumentation, wireless commu-
nications, and network security, these types of networks are
composed of small sensors placed on various body locations.
Among the numerous advantages, this BSN approach per-
mits round-the-clock measurement and recording of various
medical data, which are beneficial compared to less frequent
visits to hospitals for checkup. Not only there is convenience
for an individual, but also more data can be collected to sub-
sequently aid reliable diagnoses. In other words, a BSN helps
bridge the spatio-temporal limitations in pervasive medical
monitoring [4, 5].
Aside from medical applications, analogous scenarios
may be considered with a general network of wearable de-
vices, including cell phones, headsets, handheld computers,
and other multimedia devices. However, the incentive and
urgency for inter-networking such multimedia devices may
be less obvious and imminent (more on the convenience
side), compared to those in medical scenarios (more on the
necessity side).
The objectives of this work are to: (1) examine the
various nascent BSN structures and associated challenges,
(2) establish a flexible high-level model, encompassing
these assumptions and characteristics, that is conducive to























Figure 1: Model of a mobile health network, consisting of various body sensor networks.
future research from a signal-processing perspective, (3) pro-
pose signal processing methods and protocols, in the context
of a high-level model, that improve upon existing schemes
for providing security in BSNs. More specifically, the last ob-
jective (3) is two-fold: (a) we construct a secure key distribu-
tion system that is shown to be more resource-eﬃcient than
the current scheme based on fuzzy commitment; (b) we pro-
pose and study a data scrambling method that has the poten-
tial to supplant conventional encryption, in securing certain
types of data using biometrics [3].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide a survey of the existing research on
BSNs, highlighting the salient features and assumptions. This
is followed by a high-level summary of our methodologies
and objectives of research on BSNs in Section 3. Detailed de-
scriptions are next given for a resource-eﬃcient key man-
agement system, including key generation and distribution,
in Section 4. Then, we present the INTRAS framework for
data scrambling in Section 5. And, in order to evaluate the
system performance, simulation results are summarized in
Section 6. Lastly, concluding remarks for future directions
are given in Section 7.
2. LITERATURE SURVEY
2.1. BSN structure and assumptions
Even though BSN is a comparatively new technology, it has
garnered tremendous interest and momentum from the re-
search community. This phenomenon is easy to understand
when one remarks that a BSN is essentially a sensor network,
or to a broader extent an ad hoc network [6, 7], with charac-
teristics peculiar to mobile health applications.
So far, the current trend in BSN research has focused
mainly on medical settings [4]. As an ad hoc network, a typ-
ical BSN consists of small sensor devices, usually destined to
report medical data at varying intervals of time. Figure 1(a)
shows a typical high-level BSN organization. Each BSN con-
sists of a number of sensors, dedicated to monitoring medical
data of the wearer. As noted in [1, 4], for implanted sensors,
wireless communication is by far the preferred solution since
wired networking would necessitate laying wires within the
human body; and for wearable devices, wireless networking
is also desirable due to user convenience.
There are many possible variations on the BSN structure,
especially with respect to the network topologies formed
from various BSNs. A very simple topology is given in
Figure 1(b), depicting a mobile-health network and organiz-
ing several BSNs under one server. As explored in [5], a more
sophisticated organization can involve elected leader nodes
within a BSN, which allow for more specialized communi-
cation requirements. For instance, certain nodes have higher
computational capabilities than others in order to perform
more sophisticated tasks. This hierarchical organization is
needed for a scalable system, especially with a fixed amount
of resources.
2.2. Resource constraints in BSNs
As in a typical ad hoc network, there is a large range of varia-
tions in resource constraints. From the proposed prototypes
and test beds found in the existing literature, the computa-
tional and bandwidth limitations in BSNs are on par with
those found in the so-called microsensor networks [6, 7].
While relatively powerful sensors can be found in a BSN, the
smaller devices are destined to transmit infrequent summary
data, for example, temperature or pressure reported every 30
minutes, which translates to transmissions of small bursts of
data on the order of only several hundred, or possibly thou-
sand, bits.
The computational and storage capabilities of these net-
works have been prototyped using UC Berkeley MICA2
motes [5], each of which provides an 8-MHz ATMega-128 L
microcontroller with 128 KB of programmable flash, and 4-
Kbytes of RAM. In fact, these motes may exceed the resources
found in smaller BSN sensors. As such, to be safe, a proposed
design should not overstep the capabilities oﬀered by these
prototype devices.
With energy at a premium, a study of the source of energy
consumption in a BSN has been performed by evaluating the
amount of energy dispensed per bit of information, simi-
lar to the analysis in [6]. The conclusion is that [1, 2, 4, 8],
while computational and communication resources are both
constrained in a BSN, the most expensive one is the
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communication operation. The computational costs are typ-
ically smaller so much that they are almost negligible com-
pared to the cost of communication. Moreover, recall that the
payload data for a scheduled transmission session in a BSN
are on the order of a few hundred bits, which means that
even a typical 128-bit key employed for encryption would
be substantial by comparison. As such, only information bits
that are truly necessary should be sent over the channel. This
guideline has profound repercussions for the security proto-
cols to be adopted in a BSN.
2.3. Security and biometrics in BSNs
While the communication rate specifications in BSN are typ-
ically low, the security requirements are stringent, especially
when sensitive medical data are exchanged. It should not be
possible for sensors in other BSNs to gain access to data privy
to a particular BSN. These requirements are diﬃcult to guar-
antee due to the wireless broadcasting nature of a BSN, mak-
ing the system susceptible to eavesdroppers and intruders.
In the BSN settings evaluated by [1, 4, 5, 8], the proto-
types show that traditional security paradigms designed for
conventional wireless networks [9] are in general not suit-
able. Indeed, while many popular key distribution schemes
are asymmetric or public-key- based systems, these opera-
tions are very costly in the context of a BSN. For instance, it
was reported that to establish a 128-bit key using a Diﬃe-
Hellman system would require 15.9-mJ, while symmetric
encryption of the same bit length would consume merely
0.00115-mJ [1]. Therefore, while key distribution is certainly
important for security, the process will require significant
modifications in a BSN.
By incorporating the body itself and the various phys-
iological signal pathways as secure channels for eﬃciently
distributing the derived biometrics, security can be feasi-
bly implemented for BSN [1, 2]. For instance, a key distri-
bution scheme based on fuzzy commitment is appropriate
[1, 10]. A biometric is utilized for committing, or securely
binding, a cryptographic key for secure transmission over an
insecure channel. More detailed descriptions of this scheme
will be given in Section 2.5. Essentially, for this construction,
the biometric merely serves as a witness. The actual cryp-
tographic key, for symmetric encryption [9], is externally
generated, (i.e., independent from the physiological signals).
This is the conventional view of biometric encryption [11].
The reasons are two-fold: (1) good cryptographic keys need
to be random, and methods for realizing an external ran-
dom source are quite reliable [9]; moreover, (2) the degree of
variations in biometrics signals is such that two keys derived
from the same physiological traits typically do not match ex-
actly. And, as such, biometrically generated keys would not
be usable in conventional cryptographic schemes, which by
design do not tolerate even a single-bit error [9, 11].
2.4. The ECG as a biometric
While many physiological features can be utilized as biomet-
rics, the ECG has been found to specifically exhibit desirable
characteristics for BSN applications. First, it should be noted
that for the methods to be examined, the full-fledged ECG
signals are not required. Rather, it is suﬃcient to record only
the sequence of R-R wave intervals, referred to as the inter-
pulse interval (IPI) sequence [4]. As a result, the methods are
also valid for other cardiovascular signals, including phono-
cardiogram (PCG), and photoplethysmogram (PPG). What
is more, as reported in [1, 4, 5], there are existing sensor de-
vices for medical applications, manufactured with reasonable
costs, that can record these IPI sequences eﬀectively. That is,
the system requirements for extracting the IPI sequences can
be essentially considered negligible.
2.4.1. Time-variance and key randomness
At this point, it behooves us to distinguish between time-
invariant and time-variant biometrics. In most conventional
systems, biometrics are understood and required to be time-
invariant, for example, fingerprints or irises, which do not
depend on the time measured. This is so that, based on the
recorded biometric, an authority can uniquely identify or au-
thenticate an individual in, respectively, a one-to-many and
one-to-one scenario [11]. By contrast, ECG-based biomet-
rics are time-variant, which is a reason why they have not
found much prominence in traditional biometric applica-
tions. Fortunately, for a BSN setting, it is precisely the time-
varying nature of the ECG that makes it a prime candidate
for good security. As already mentioned, good cryptographic
keys need a high degree of randomness, and keys derived
from random time-varying signals have higher security, since
an intruder cannot reliably predict the true key. This is espe-
cially the case with ECG, since it is time-varying, changing
with various physiological activities [12]. More precisely, as
previously reported in [13], heart rate variability is charac-
terized by a (bounded) random process.
2.4.2. Timing synchronization and key recoverability
Of course, key randomness is only part of the security prob-
lem. An ECG biometric would not be of great value unless
the authorized party can successfully recover the intended
cryptographic key from it. In other words, the second re-
quirement is that the ECG-generated key should be repro-
ducible with high fidelity at various sensor nodes in the same
BSN.
To expose the feasibility of accurate biometric repro-
ducibility at various sensors, let us consider typical ECG sig-
nals from the PhysioBank [14], as shown in Figure 2. For
the present paper, it suﬃces to focus on the so-called QRS-
complexes, particularly the R-waves, which represent usually
the highest peaks in an ECG signal [12, 15]. The sequence
of R-R intervals is termed the interpulse interval (IPI) se-
quence [4] and essentially represents the time intervals be-
tween successive pulses. In this case, three diﬀerent ECG sig-
nals are measured simultaneously from three diﬀerent elec-
trode or lead placements (I, AVL, VZ [12, 14]). What is
noteworthy is that, while the shapes of specific QRS com-
plexes are diﬀerent for each signal, the sequences of IPI for
the three signals, with proper timing synchronization, are
remarkably identical. Physiologically, this is because the three
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Figure 2: ECG signals simultaneously recorded from three diﬀerent
leads. (Taken from the PhysioBank [14].)
leads measure three representations of the same cardiovascu-
lar phenomenon, which originates from the same heart [12].
In particular, the IPI sequences capture the heart rate varia-
tions, which should be the same regardless of the measure-
ment site.
Therefore, in order to recover identical IPI sequences at
various sensors, accurate timing synchronization is a key re-
quirement. While the mechanism of timing synchronization
is not directly addressed in this paper, one possible solution
is to treat this issue from a network broadcast level [1, 4, 5].
Briefly stated, in order that all sensors will ultimately pro-
duce the same IPI, they should all listen to an external broad-
cast command that serves to reinitialize, at some scheduled
time instant, the ECG recording and IPI extraction process.
This scheduling coordination also has a dual function of
implementing key refreshing [4, 5, 9]. Since a fresh key is
established in the BSN with each broadcast command for
re-initialization, the system can enforce key renewal as fre-
quently as needed to satisfy the security demand of the envi-
sioned application: more refreshing ensures higher security,
at the cost of increased system complexity.
2.5. Single-point fuzzy key management with ECG
So far, various strategies in the literature have exploited ECG
biometrics to bind an externally generated cryptographic
key and distribute it to other sensors via fuzzy commitment
[1, 2, 5, 16]. The cryptographic key intended for the entire
BSN is generated at a single point, and then distributed to
the remaining sensors. In addition, the key is generated in-


















k′ = G(u′, COM)
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Figure 3: Single-point fuzzy key management.
witnesses. For these reasons, we will henceforth refer to this
scheme as single-point fuzzy commitment.
Figure 3 summarizes the general configuration of the
single-point key management. The data structures of the sig-
nals at various stages are as follows:
(i) r: the sequence of IPI derived from the heart, repre-
sented by a sequence of numbers, the range and res-
olution of which are dependent on the sensor devices
used.
(ii) u: obtained by uniform quantization of r, followed by
conversion to binary, using a PCM code [17].
(iii) r′, u′: the corresponding quantities to the nonprime
versions, which are derived from the receiver side.
(iv) ksession: an externally generated random key to be used
for symmetric encryption in the BSN. It needs to be an
error correction code, as explained in the sequel.
(v) k′: the recovered key, with the same specifications as
ksession.
(vi) COM: the commitment signal, generated using a com-
mitment function F defined as










where h(·) is a one-way hash function [9], and⊕ is the
XOR operator.
Therefore, the commitment signal to be transmitted is a
concatenation of the hashed value of the key and an XOR-
bound version of the key. With the requirement of ksession
being a codeword of an error correcting code, with decoder
function f (·), the receiver produces a recovered key k′, using
a fuzzy knowledge of u′, as
k′ = G(u′, COM) = G(u′, a,d) = f (u′ ⊕ d). (2)
If f (·) is a t-bit error-correcting decoder (i.e., can correct
errors with a Hamming distance of up to t), then
f
(
u′ ⊕ d) = f (ksession +
(
u′ ⊕ u)) = f (ksession + e
)
. (3)
Hence, as long as r and r′ are suﬃciently similar, so that
|e| ≤ t, the key distribution should be successful. This can be
verified using the included check-code a = h(ksession): check-
ing whether h(k′) = a = h(ksession). However, if the check-
code is also corrupted, a false verification failure may occur.
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3. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The existing research in BSN using ECG biometric can be
classified into two major categories: network topology (via
clustering formation), and key distribution (via fuzzy com-
mitment). We will not address the first topic in this pa-
per (the interested reader can refer to [5] and the refer-
ences therein). However, in the previous section, we have re-
viewed in some detail the second challenge of key distribu-
tion, since one part of our contribution will focus on extend-
ing this approach. Furthermore, we also see the need for a
third area of research: the data encryption stage, which is of
course the raison d’eˆtre for secure key distribution in the first
place.
In the BSN context, the use of conventional encryption
is hampered by the key variability inherent in biometric sys-
tems. Biometric signals are typically noisy, which inevitably
lead to variations, however minute, in the recovered crypto-
graphic keys. The problem is that, however minute the vari-
ation, a single-bit error is suﬃcient to engender a decryption
debacle with conventional cryptography. It is possible to em-
ploy extremely powerful error-correcting coders and gener-
ous request-resend protocols to counteract these diﬃculties.
Of course, the amount of accrued energy consumption and
system complexity would then defeat the promise of eﬃcient
designs using biometrics.
A more practical alternative would be to employ an en-
cryption scheme that is inherently designed to rectify the in-
evitable key variations. One such alternative is the fuzzy vault
method [11], the security of which is based on the intractable
polynomial root finding problem. However, this choice may
not be practical, since the scheme requires high computa-
tional demands, which can defy even conventional commu-
nication devices, let alone the more resource-scarce BSN sen-
sors.
With the above challenges in mind, we propose two flex-
ible methodologies for improving resource consumption in
BSN. First, we present a key management scheme that con-
sumes less communication resources compared to the exist-
ing single-point fuzzy key method, by trading oﬀ process-
ing delay and computational complexity for spectral eﬃ-
ciency, which is the eﬀective data rate transmitted per avail-
able bandwidth [17]. This represents more eﬃcient use of
bandwidth and power resources.
Second, to accommodate the key mismatch problem
of conventional encryption, we propose a data scrambling
framework known as INTRAS, being based on interpola-
tion and random sampling. This framework is attractive not
only for its convenient and low-complexity implementation,
but also for its more graceful degradations in case of minor
key variations. These characteristics accommodate the lim-
ited processing capabilities of the BSN devices and reinforce
INTRAS as a viable alternative candidate for ensuring secu-
rity in BSN based on physiological signals.
In order to be feasibly implementable in a BSN con-
text, a design should not impose heavy resource demands.
To ensure this is the case, we will adhere to the precedents
set by the existing research. Only methods and modules
which have been deemed appropriate for the existing pro-
totypes would be utilized. In this sense, our contributions
are not in the instrumentation or acquisition stages, rather
we propose modifications in the signal processing arena,
with new and improved methodologies and protocols that
are nonetheless compatible with the existing hardware infra-
structure.
4. MULTIPOINT FUZZY KEY MANAGEMENT
As discussed above, only information bits that are truly es-
sential should be transmitted in a BSN. But, by design, the
minimum number of bits, required by the COM sequence,
in single-point key management scheme is the length of the
cryptographic key (no check-code transmitted). Motivated
by this design limitation, we seek a more flexible and eﬃcient
alternative. The basic idea is to send only the check-code and
not a modified version of the key itself over the channel. At
each sensoring point in a BSN, the cryptographic key is re-
generated from the commonly available biometrics. As such,
this scheme is referred to as multipoint fuzzy key manage-
ment.
With respect to key generation, the possibility of con-
structing ksession from the biometric signal r has been ex-
plored in [4, 16], with the conclusion that the ECG signals
have enough entropy to generate good cryptographic keys.
But note that this generation is only performed at a single
point. In other words, the only change in Figure 3 is that
ksession itself is now some mapped version of u.
However, because of the particular design of BSN, other
sensor nodes also have access to similar versions of u. As ex-
plained above, the generated biometrics sequences from sen-
sors within the same BSN are remarkably similar. For in-
stance, it has been reported that for a 128-bit u sequence
captured at a particular time instant, sensors within the same
BSN have Hamming distances less than 22; by contrast, sen-
sors outside the BSN typically result in Hamming distances
of 80 or higher [18]. Then, loosely speaking, it should be pos-
sible to reliably extract an identical sequence of some length
less than 106 bits from all sensors within a BSN.
It should be noted that these findings are obtained for a
normal healthy ECG. Under certain conditions, the amount
of reliable bits recovered may deviate significantly from the
nominal value. But note that these cited values are for any
independent time segments corresponding to 128 raw bits
derived from the continually varying IPI sequence. In other
words, even if the recoverability rate is less, it is possible to
reliably obtain an arbitrary finite-length key, by simply ex-
tracting enough bits from a finite number of nonoverlapping
128-bit snapshots derived from the IPI sequences. This possi-
bility is not available with a time-invariant biometric, for ex-
ample, a fingerprint biometric, where the information con-
tent or entropy is more or less fixed.
In a multipoint scheme, a full XOR-ed version of the key
no longer needs to be sent over the channel. Instead, only the
check-code needs to be transmitted for verification. Further-
more, the amount of check-code to be sent can be varied for
bandwidth eﬃciency, depending on the quality of verifica-
tion desired.



































Figure 4: Multipoint fuzzy key management scheme.
4.1. Multipoint system modules
The basic hardware units supporting the following modules
are already present in a single-point system. Thus, the in-
novation is in the design of the roles that these blocks take
at various points in the transmission protocol. A high-level
summary of the proposed multipoint scheme is depicted in
Figure 4.
4.1.1. Binary encoder
Similar to a single-point key management, the first step in-
volves signal conditioning by binary encoding (i.e., quanti-
zation and symbol mapping).
4.1.2. Error-correcting decoder
The next step seeks to remove just enough (dissimilar) fea-
tures from a signal so that, for two suﬃciently similar input
signals, a common identical signal is produced. This goal is
identical to that of an error-correcting decoder, if we treat the
signals u and u′ as if they were two corrupted codewords, de-
rived from a common clean codeword, of some hypothetical
error-correcting code.
For an error-correcting encoder with n-bit codewords,
any n-bit binary sequence can be considered as a codeword
plus some channel distortions. This concept is made more
explicit in Figure 5. Here, we have conceptually modeled
the ECG signal-generation process to include a hypothetical
channel encoder and a virtual distorting channel. In an anal-
ogous formulation, many relevant similarities are found in
the concept of the so-called superchannel [19]. A superchan-
nel is used to model the equivalent eﬀect of all distortions,
not just the fading channel typical of the physical layer, but
also other nonlinearities in other communication layers, with
the assumption of cross-layer interactions.
An analogous study of the various types of codes and
suitable channel models, in the BSN context, would be be-
yond the scope of this paper. Instead, the goal of the present
paper is to establish the general framework for this approach.

















IPI sequence extraction model
Figure 5: Equivalent superchannel formulation of ECG generation
process.
In addition, while the optimal coding scheme for a BSN may
not be a conventional error-correcting code [17, 19], we will
limit our attention to a conventional BCH code family, to
evaluate the feasibility of this superchannel formulation.
In practical terms, for Figure 4, a conventional BCH
error-correcting decoder is used to encode a raw binary se-
quence, treated as a corrupted codeword of a correspond-
ing hypothetical BCH encoder. This means that the error-
correcting decoder in Figure 4 is used to reverse this hy-
pothetical encoding process, generating hopefully similar
copies of the pre-key kP at various sensors, even though the
various u-sequences may be diﬀerent. In essence, the key idea
of this error-correction decoder module is to correct the er-
rors caused by the physiological pathways. The equivalent
communication channels consist of the nonidealities and dis-
tortions existing between the heart and the sensor nodes.
In the following, we analyze the practical consequences,
in terms of the required error-correcting specification, of the
above conceptual model. Let us assume that ideal access to
the undistorted IPI sequence RI originates directly from the
heart. Then, each sensor receives a (possibly) distorted copy
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where ci(·) represents the distorting channel from the heart
to each sensor i.
Next, approximating the binary-equivalent channels as
additive-noise channels [17], we can write
u1 = uI + e1,u2 = uI + e2, . . . ,uN = uI + eN , (5)
where uI is the binary-encoded sequence of RI , and ei repre-
sents the equivalent binary channel noise between the heart
and sensor i.
Furthermore, consider an error-correcting code C with
parameters (n, k, t), where n is the bit-length of a codeword,
k is the bit-length of a message symbol, and t is the number of
correctable bit errors. Let the encoder and decoder functions
of C be eC(·) and dC(·), respectively. Define the demapping
operation as the composite function fC(·) = eC(dC(·)). In
other words, for a particular n-bit sequence x, the operation
x̂ = fC(x) should demap x to the closest n-bit codeword x̂.
Then, suppose the bit-length of uI is n and apply the
demapper to obtain: ûI = fC(uI) = uI + E, where |E| ≤ t
is the Hamming distance from uI to the nearest codeword ûI .

























The preceding relations imply that correct decoding is pos-
sible if |e1 − E| ≤ t, . . . , |eN − E| ≤ t. Moreover, the cor-
rect demapped codeword sequence is ûI , which is due to the
original ideal sequence uI directly from the heart. If error-
correction is successful at all nodes according to the above
condition, then the same pre-key sequence, kP = dC(uI) =
dC(ûI), will be available at all sensors.
The above assessment is actually pessimistic. Indeed, it
is accurate for the case where the channels ci’s have not dis-
torted the sensor signals too far away from the ideal sequence
uI . However, when all the sensor channels carry the signals
further away from the ideal case, the same code sequence can
still be obtained from all sensors. But in this case, the de-
coded sequence will no longer be ûI , as examined next.
Let the codeword closest to all sequences u1,u2, . . . ,uN
be uC . The condition that all signals have moved far away
from the ideal case is more precisely defined by requiring the
Hamming distance between uC and uI to be strictly greater
than t (sensor sequences no longer correctable to uI by the
error-correcting decoder). Let
u1 = uC + 1,u2 = uC + 2, . . . ,uN = uC + N , (7)
where i represents the respective Hamming distance. Then,
the same key sequence, namely kP = dC(uC), is recoverable at
all sensors provided that 1 ≤ t, . . . , N ≤ t. In other words,
the signals may depart significantly from the ideal case but
will still be suitable for key generation, provided that they
are all close enough to some codeword uC .
4.1.3. Morphing encoder and random set optimization
The relevant data structures for this module are:
(i) kp, k′p: pre-key sequences, with similar structures as the
session keys in the single-point scheme.
(ii) m(·), mindex: respectively, the morphing function and
a morphing index, which is a short input sequence, for
example, 2 to 4 bits. Here, we use the cryptographic
hash function SHA-1 [9] for the morphing function
m(·).
(iii) ksession, k′: morphed versions of the pre-key sequences
to accommodate privacy issues. Since the output of the
SHA-1 function is a 160-bit sequence, for an intended
128-bit key, one can either use the starting or the end-
ing 128-bit segment.
From a cryptographic perspective, the generated pre-key
kP is already suitable for a symmetric encryption scheme; as
such, this morphing block can be considered optional. How-
ever, one of the stated goals is to ensure user privacy and
confidentiality. As noted in [11], for privacy reasons, any sig-
nals, including biometrics, generated from physiological data
should not be retraceable to the original data. The reason is
because the original data may reveal sensitive medical con-
ditions of the user, which is the case for the ECG. Therefore,
a morphing block serves to confidently remove obvious cor-
relations between the generated key and the original medical
data.
In addition, due to the introduction of a morphing block,
there is an added advantage that ensues, especially for the IN-
TRAS framework to be presented in Section 5. First, suppose
that we can associate a security metric (SM) to a pair of input
data x and its encrypted version xd, which measures in some
sense the dissimilarity as SM(x, xd). Then, we can optimize
the level of security by picking an appropriate key sequence.
Deferring the details of INTRAS to the next section, we ex-
amine this idea as follows. Let x be a sequence of data to be
scrambled, using a key sequence d. The scrambled output is
xd = INTRAS(x,d). (8)
Then, for the sequence x, the best key dopt should be







In other words, d = dopt is a data-dependent sequence
that maximizes the dissimilarity between x and the scram-
bled version xd. Of course, implementing this kind of “opti-
mal” security may not be practical. First, solving for dopt can
be diﬃcult, especially with nonlinear interpolators. In addi-
tion, since the optimal key is data-dependent, the transmitter
would then need to securely exchange this key with the re-
ceiver, which defeats the whole purpose of key management.
A more suitable alternative is to consider the technique of
random set optimization. Essentially, for diﬃcult optimiza-
tion problems, one can perform an (exhaustive) search over
some limited random set from the feasible space. If the set is
suﬃciently random, then the constrained solution can be a
good estimate of the optimal solution.
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Combining the above two goals of data hiding and key
optimization, a morphing block, denoted by m(·), can be
suitably implemented using a keyed hash function [9]. With
this selection, the first goal is trivially satisfied. Furthermore,
a property of a hash function is that small changes in the
input results in significant changes in the output (i.e., the
avalanche eﬀect [9]). In other words, it is possible to gen-
erate a pseudorandom set using simple indexing changes in
a morphing function, starting from a pre-key kp. Specifically,
consider the generation of the key sequence d for INTRAS:
d = m([kp,mindex
])
, mindex ∈M, (10)
with M being the available index set for the morphing in-
dex mindex. The cardinality of M should be small enough that
mindex (e.g., a short sequence of 2 to 4 bits) can be sent as side
information in COM. The input to the morphing function is
the concatenation of kp and the morphing index mindex. Due
to the avalanche eﬀect, even small changes due to the short
morphing index would be suﬃcient to generate large varia-
tions in the output sequence d.
Then, corresponding to Figure 4, the appropriate ksession
is the one generated from kp using mindex opt, where







In the above equation, d is defined as in (10). This optimiza-
tion can be exhaustively solved, since the cardinality of M
is small. As shown in Figure 4, mindex can be transmitted as
plain-text side-information as part of COM, that is, without
encryption. This is plausible because, without knowing kp,
knowing mindex does not reveal information about ksession.
It should also be noted that only the transmitting node
needs to perform the key optimization. Therefore, if com-
putational resource needs to be conserved, this step can be
simplified greatly (e.g., selecting a random index for trans-
mission) without aﬀecting the overall protocol.
The selection of an appropriate SM is an open research
topic, which needs to take into account various operating is-
sues, such as implementation requirements as well as the sta-
tistical nature of the data to be encrypted. For the present pa-
per, we will use as an illustrative example the mean-squared
error (MSE) criterion for the SM. In general, the MSE is not a
good SM, since there exist deterministically invertible trans-
forms that result in high MSE. However, the utility of the
MSE, especially for multimedia data, is that it can provide a
reasonable illustration of the amount of (gradual) distortions
caused by typical lossy compression methods. An important
argument to be made in Section 5 is that, in the presence of
noise and key variations, the recovered data suﬀer a similar
gradual degradation. Therefore, the use of the MSE to assess
the diﬀerence between the original and recovered images is
especially informative. In other words, there is a dual goal of
investigating the robustness of the INTRAS inverse, or recov-
ery process.
4.1.4. Transmission and error detection
(i) DET and E(·): the error-detection bits, and the func-
tion used to generate these bits, respectively. For sim-
plicity, the same hash function SHA-1 is used for E(·).
(ii) COM: the commitment signal actually transmitted
over the channel.
Note that COM is the concatenation of the morphing
index and part of DET. Being the output of SHA-1, DET
is a 160-bit sequence. However, since error detection—as
opposed to correction in the single-point scheme—is per-
formed, it is not necessary to use the entire sequence. There-
fore, depending on the bandwidth constraint or the desired
security performance, only some segment of the sequence is
partially transmitted, for example, the first 32 or 64 bits as
done in the simulation results. The length of this partial se-
quence determines the confidence of verification and can be
adapted according to the envisioned application.
The receiver should already have all the information
needed to regenerate the pre-key kp. Possible key mismatches
are detected based on the partial DET bits transmitted. If ver-
ification fails, a request for retransmission needs to be sent,
for example, using an ARQ-type protocol.
4.2. Performance and efficiency
The previous sections show that the most significant advan-
tage of a multipoint scheme, in a BSN context, involves the
eﬃcient allocation of the scarce communication spectrum.
With respect to spectral eﬃciency, the number of COM bits
required for the original single-point scheme is at least the
length of the cryptographic key. By contrast, since the pro-
posed system only requires the transmitted bits for error de-
tection, the number can be made variable. Therefore, de-
pending on the targeted amount of confidence, the number
of transmitted bits can be accordingly allocated for spectral
eﬃciency.
However, this resource conservation is achieved at the ex-
pense of other performance factors. First, as in the single-
point key management scheme, the success of the proposed
multipoint construction relies on the similarities of the phys-
iological signals at the various sensors. Although the require-
ments in terms of the Hamming distance conditions are sim-
ilar, there are some notable diﬀerences. For the single-point
management, from (3), the tolerable bit diﬀerence is quan-
tifiable completely in terms of the pair of binary features u
and u′. By contrast, for the multipoint management, from
(6), the tolerable bit diﬀerence is also dependent on the dis-
tance of the uncorrupted binary IPI sequence uI from the
closest codeword. In other words, the closer the IPI sequence
is from a valid codeword, the less sensitive it is from varia-
tions in multiple biometric acquisitions.
This preceding observation provides possible directions
to reinforce the robustness and improve the performance
of the multipoint approach. For instance, in order to re-
duce the potential large variations in Hamming distances,
Gray coding can be utilized in the binary encoder. This al-
lows for incremental changes in the input signals to be re-
flected as the smallest possible Hamming distances [17].











































Figure 6: Multipoint management with key fusion.
Moreover, in order to improve the distances between the ob-
tained IPI sequences and the codewords, an error-correcting
code that takes into account some prior knowledge regarding
the signal constellation is preferred. In other words, this is
a superchannel approach, that seeks an optimal code that is
most closely matched to the signal space. Of course, addi-
tional statistical knowledge regarding the underlying physio-
logical processes would be needed.
Therefore, in the present paper, the performance results
without these possible modifications will be evaluated, de-
livering the lower-bound benchmark upon which future de-
signs can be assessed. It is expected that the false-rejection
rates will demonstrate more significant gains. This is be-
cause, by design, the multipoint scheme can detect variations
and errors with good accuracy (i.e., providing good false-
acceptance rates). However, it is less robust in correcting the
errors due to coding mismatches. And it is in this latter aspect
that future improvements can be made.
In either scheme, there is also an implicit requirement of
a buﬀer to store the IPI sequences prior to encoding. Con-
sider the distribution of a 128-bit cryptographic key in a
BSN, obtained from multiple time segments of nonoverlap-
ping IPI sequences with the BCH code (63, 16, 11). Then, the
number of IPI raw input bits to be stored in the buﬀer would
be (128/16)× 63 = 504 bits.
To assess the corresponding time delay, consider a typical
heart rate of 70 beats per minute [15]. Also, each IPI value is
used to generate 8 bits. Then, the time required to collect the
504 bits is approximately (504/8) × (60/70) = 54 seconds.
In fact, this value should be considered a bare minimum.
First, additional computational delays would be incurred in
a real application. Furthermore, the system may also need
to wait longer, for the recorded physiological signal to gen-
erate suﬃcient randomness and reliability for the key gen-
eration. While the heart rate variations are a bounded ran-
dom process [13], the rate of change may not be fast enough
for a user’s preference. In other words, a 504-bit sequence
obtained in 54 seconds may not be suﬃciently random. To
address this inherent limitation, in trading oﬀ the time delay
for less bandwidth consumption, a compromise is made in
the next section.
4.3. Multipoint management with
key fusion extension
In the system considered so far, the sole random source for
key generation is the ECG. Without requiring an external
random source, a multipoint strategy has enabled a BSN
to be more eﬃcient with respect to the communication re-
sources, at the expense of computational complexity and
processing delay. As discussed in Section 2.2, this is gener-
ally a desirable setup for a BSN [1, 2]. However, in operating
scenarios where the longer delays and higher computational
complexity become prohibitive, it is possible to resort to an
intermediate case.
Suppose the security requirements dictate a certain key
length. Then, the key can be partitioned into two compo-
nents: the first constructed by an external random source,
while the second derived from the ECG. The total number
of bits generated equals the required key length. Evidently,
for a system with severe bandwidth restriction, most of the
key bits should be derived from the ECG. Conversely, when
transmission delay is a problem, more bits should be gener-
ated by an external source.
A high-level summary of a possible key fusion approach
is depicted in Figure 6. The key ksession is a concatenation of
two components, that is, (kcomp1, kcomp2). The first compo-
nent kcomp1 is distributed using fuzzy commitment, while the
second kcomp2 is sent using the multipoint scheme.
In order to ensure that the overall cryptographic key is
secured using mutually exclusive information, it is necessary
to partition the output from the binary encoder properly. As
a concrete example, let us consider generating a 128-bit key,
half from a fuzzy commitment and half from a multipoint
distribution, using a BCH (63, 16, 11) code. Then, the first
128/2 = 64 bits from the raw binary output are used to bind
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the externally generated 64-bit sequence. The remaining 64
bits need to be generated from the next (64/16) × 63 = 252
raw input bits. In other words, this scheme requires waiting
for 64 + 252 = 316 bits to be recorded, as opposed to 504 bits
in the nonfusion multipoint case.
Therefore, from an implementation perspective, this fu-
sion system allows a BSN to adaptively modify its key con-
struction, depending on the delay requirements. But the dis-
advantage is the sensors need to be suﬃciently complicated
to carry out the adaptation in the first place. For instance,
additional information needs to be transmitted for proper
transceiver synchronization in the key construction. Further-
more, some form of feedback is needed to adjust the key
length for true resource adaption. These requirements are
conceptually represented by the key length partitioning con-
trol block in Figure 6. It can be practically implemented by
embedding additional control data bits into the transmitted
COM sequence to coordinate the receiver. As with most prac-
tical feedback methods, there is some inevitable delay in the
system adaptive response.
Nonetheless, whenever implementable, a key fusion ap-
proach is the most general one, encompassing both the
single-point and multipoint schemes as special cases, in ad-
dition to other intermediate possibilities.
5. INTRAS DATA SCRAMBLING
In the previous section, the general infrastructure and several
approaches for generating and establishing common keys
at various nodes in a secure manner have been described.
The next straightforward strategy would be to utilize these
keys in some traditional symmetric encryption scheme [9].
However, in the context of a BSN, this approach has several
shortcomings. First, since conventional encryption schemes
are not conceived with considerations of resource limitations
in BSN, a direct application of these schemes typically im-
plies resource ineﬃciency or performance loss in security.
Second, operating at the bit-level, conventional encryption
schemes are also highly sensitive to mismatching of the en-
cryption/decryption keys: even a single-bit error, by design,
results in a nonsense output.
Addressing the above limitations of conventional encryp-
tion in the context of a BSN, we propose an alternative
method that operates at the signal-sample level. The method
is referred to as INTRAS, being eﬀectively a combination
of interpolation and random sampling, which is inspired by
[20, 21]. The idea is to modify the signal after sampling, but
before binary encoding.
5.1. Envisioned domain of applicability
The proposed method is suitable for input data at the signal-
level (nonbinary) form, which is typical of the raw data
transmitted in a BSN. There are two fundamental reasons for
this constraint.
First, for good performance in terms of security with
this scheme, the input needs to have a suﬃciently large dy-
namic range. Consider the interpolation process (explained
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Figure 7: Interpolation and random sampling (INTRAS) structure.
duce interpolated outputs that have either insuﬃcient varia-
tions (e.g., consider linear interpolation between 1 and 1, or 0
and 0) or result in output symbols that are not in the original
binary alphabet (e.g., consider linear interpolation between
1 and 0). More seriously, for a brute force attack, the FIR
process (see (14)) can be modeled as a finite-state machine
(assuming a finite discrete alphabet). Then, in constructing a
trellis diagram [17], the comparison of a binary alphabet ver-
sus a 16-bit alphabet translates to 21 branches versus (poten-
tially) 216 branches in each trellis state. Therefore, working at
a binary level would compromise the system performance. In
other words, we are designing a symbol recoder. As such the
method draws upon the literature in nonuniform random
sampling [21].
Second, the scheme is meant to tolerate small key vari-
ations (a problem for conventional encryption), as well as
to deliver a low-complexity implementation (a problem for
fuzzy vault). However, the cost to be paid is a possibly imper-
fect recovery, due to interpolation diﬀusion errors with an
imperfect key sequence. It will be seen that in the presence of
key variations, the resulting distortions are similar to grad-
ual degradations found in lossy compression algorithms, as
opposed to the all-or-none abrupt recovery failure exhibited
by conventional encryption. Therefore, similar to the lossy
compression schemes, the intended input should also be the
raw signal-level data.
5.2. INTRAS high-level structure
The general structure of an INTRAS scrambler is shown in
Figure 7, with an input sequence x[n]. At each instant n, the
resampling block simply re samples the interpolated signal
xI(t) using a delay d[n] to produce the scrambled output
xd[n]. Security here is obtained from the fact that, by prop-
erly designing the interpolating filter, the input cannot be re-
covered from the scrambled output xd[n], without knowl-
edge of the delay sequence d[n].
In a BSN context, the available (binary) encryption key
ksession is used to generate a set of sampling instants d[n],
by multilevel symbol-coding of ksession [17]. This set of sam-
pling instants is then used to resample the interpolated data
sequence. Note that, when properly generated, ksession is a
random key, and that the derived d[n] inherits this ran-
domness. In other words, the resampling process corre-
sponds eﬀectively to random sampling of the original data
sequence. Without knowledge of the key sequence, the unau-
thorized recovery of the original data sequence, for example,
by brute-force attack, from the resampled signal is compu-
tationally impractical. By contrast, with knowledge of d[n],
the recovery of the original data is eﬃciently performed; in
some cases, an iterative solution is possible. Therefore, the
















Figure 8: Graphical illustration of linear interpolation followed by
random sampling.
proposed scheme satisfies the main characteristics of a prac-
tical cryptographic system. More importantly, it not only re-
quires less computational resources for implementation, but
also is more robust to small mismatching of the encryption
and decryption keys, which is often the case in biometrics
systems.
5.3. INTRAS with linear Interpolators
While Figure 7 shows an intermediate interpolated analog
signal, xI(t), this is more or less a convenient abstraction
only. Depending on the filter used and the method of resam-
pling, we can in fact bypass the continuous-time processing
completely.
First, the window size or memory length M needs to be
selected, determining the range of time instants over which
the resampling can occur. For a causal definition, the win-
dow needs to span only the previous data symbols. Then, the
current output symbol is obtained as a linear combination of
the previous symbols.
Consider a simple linear interpolator with M = 1, so
that the window size is two symbols, consisting of the cur-
rent symbol and one previous one. Then, the resampled sig-
nal xd[n] can be obtained in discrete-time form as
xd[n] = a0[n] · x[n] + a1[n] · x[n− 1]
= d[n] · x[n] + (1− d[n]) · x[n− 1],
(12)
where 0 ≤ d[n] ≤ 1. The rationale for this definition is il-
lustrated in Figure 8. When d = 0, the output is the previ-
ous symbol. When d = 1, it is the current symbol. And for
0 < d < 1, the filter interpolates between these values. This
is precisely what a linear interpolator does but implemented
entirely in discrete-time. The iterative definition (12) needs
initialization to be complete: a virtual pre-symbol can be de-
fined with an arbitrary value x[−1] = A.
Also, observe that computing xd[n] actually corresponds
to computing a convex combination of two consecutive sym-
bols x[n] and x[n − 1], that is, weighting coeﬃcients a0, a1
satisfy
a0 + a1 = 1, a0 ≥ 0, a1 ≥ 0, (13)
for each n. A convex combination is suﬃcient to maintain the
full dynamic range (in fact, a more generalized linear com-
bination is redundant, since it leads to unbounded output
value).
The INTRAS structure is a scrambler because, depending
on the random sequence d[n], the output signal can diﬀer
significantly from the input. However, it is not encryption in
the conventional sense, since knowing the input data and en-
crypted output is equivalent to knowing the key. Moreover,
small mismatches in the decryption key do not lead immedi-
ately to nonsense output but rather represent a more graceful
degradation, characterized by an increasing mean-squared
error (MSE). This is in stark contrast to the all-or-none cri-
terion of conventional encryption and is thus more suitable
for biometric systems.
As the memory length M is increased, a number of pos-
sibilities can be applied in interpolation. For example, (i) the
simplest approach is to simply interpolate between every two
successive samples (graphically, joining a straight line). Then,
the sampling delay determines which line should be used to
pick the scrambled output. Or, (ii) linear regression can be
first performed over the symbols spanning the window of in-
terest [22]. Then, the sampling delay is applied to the best-fit
regression line to produce the output. Alternatively, (iii) by
revisiting the form of (12), which recasts interpolation as a
convex combination, we can expand the formulation to in-
corporate a multiple-symbol combination as follows:






where the convex combination condition, for a proper out-




a0 ≥ 0, a1 ≥ 0, . . . , aM ≥ 0.
(15)
Therefore, the cryptographic key ksession is used to encode
M + 1 sequences of random coeﬃcients. (Actually, because
of the convex-combination requirement, there is a loss of de-
gree of freedom, and only M sequences of this set are inde-
pendent). Equivalently, the operation corresponds to a time-
varying FIR filter [17] (with random coeﬃcients).
This previous construction can be recast as a special case
of the classical Hill cipher [9] as follows. Consider an input
sequence x[n] = {x[0], x[1], . . . , x[N − 1]} of length N . For
the purpose of illustration, let us select M = 2, which im-
plies that we need to initialize the first 2 virtual pre-symbols,
{x[−2], x[−1]} with assumed secret values, known to the in-
tended receiver. One straight-forward approach would be to
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generate these symbols from the available cryptographic key
ksession.
For notational simplicity, let us denote the coeﬃcient se-
quences as A[n] = a0[n],B[n] = a1[n],C[n] = a2[n]. Then,
the remaining scrambled output symbols are computed for
n = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1 as
xd[0] = A[0]x[0] + B[0]x[−1] + C[0]x[−2],
xd[1] = A[1]x[1] + B[1]x[0] + C[1]x[−1],
...
xd[N − 1] = A[N − 1]x[N − 1] + B[N − 1]x[N − 2]
+ C[N − 1]x[N − 3],
(16)
which can be expressed in a matrix form:
Ax = xd. (17)
An expanded version of this equation is shown in Table 1.
Here, we have rearranged the equations and augmented the
last two rows with the virtual pre-symbols, so that the final
form is explicitly recognized as a row-echelon matrix [22].
The obtained linear matrix representation is reminiscent
of the Hill cipher, which is also a linear map modulo 26 (for
26 letters in the alphabet). However, there are some basic dif-
ferences to be remarked here. First, the Hill cipher does not
restrict the form of A, which can consist of any numbers. This
means that the dimension of the mapping matrix needs to
be small, otherwise matrix inversion would be prohibitively
expensive. However, keeping the dimension small is equiva-
lent to low security. Moreover, the Hill cipher is also unusable
whenever A is singular.
In our proposed scheme, the above disadvantages are
largely avoided. From the row-echelon form in Table 1, as
long as A[n] /= 0, for all n, then A has full-rank. Thus, the
matrix equation will always have a solution, which is also
unique. This shows that during the generation of random
coeﬃcients, the coeﬃcient sequence A[n] should be kept
nonzero. In addition, the dimension of A is (N + M)× (N +
M). For a typical signal sequence, this represents a large ma-
trix, which would not be practical with a standard Hill cipher.
But in this case, direct matrix inversion does not need to
be performed. Instead an iterative solution can be obtained.
Starting from the first symbol, we solve for x[n], given xd[n],
and the knowledge of the coeﬃcient sequences and virtual
pre-symbols. For M = 2, we start with
x[0] = xd[0]− a1[0] · x[−1]− a2[0] · x[−2]
a0[0]
. (18)






Therefore, with the knowledge of the coeﬃcient sequences
and the virtual pre-symbols, the signal can be descrambled
eﬃciently in an iterative manner.
Furthermore, the row-echelon representation also shows
that without complete knowledge of the coeﬃcient se-
quences, or the virtual pre-symbols, the original data se-
quence x cannot be uniquely solved. Indeed, a linear system
either has: (1) a unique solution, (2) no solution, or (3) in-
finitely many solutions [22]. Missing any of the coeﬃcients is
tantamount to incomplete knowledge of a row of the echelon
matrix, which then implies either case (2) or (3) only. And
assuming that the echelon matrix A is properly constructed
withA[n] /= 0, for all n, then the incomplete A (with a deleted
row whenever the corresponding delay symbol is unknown)
still has full rank [22]. This then implies that case (3) is true:
an intruder without knowledge of the delay sequences would
need to guess from infinitely many possible choices in the so-
lution space.
However, there is a catastrophic case in the current form
(17): when x contains long runs of constant values, then the
corresponding segment in xd in fact does not change at all.
This is because each row of A creates a convex combination.
A simple fix involves using the bits from ksession to create a
premasking vector that randomly flips the signs of elements
in x. This is achieved by directly remapping the sequence of 0
and 1 in ksession to −1 and 1, which is called the sequence s˜R.
Since the goal here is to simply prevent long runs of a single
constant value, rather than true randomness, it is permissible
to stack together a number of s˜R sequences to create a longer
























Enough of the s˜R sequences should be concatenated (with a
possible truncation of the last sequence) to make the dimen-
sion of sR exactly N × 1 (an N-element column vector, with
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elements being either−1 or 1). Then, a sign-perturbed input
sequence is computed as


















where the last vector is augmented to account for virtual pre-
symbols (which should not have long runs of constant values,
being created from a random key), and ⊗ denotes element-
wise multiplication. Then, the modified scrambling opera-
tion
xd = Ax̂ (22)
is no longer limited by the above catastrophic case, since
there are now deliberate signal perturbations even when the
original input is static.
5.4. INTRAS with higher-order interpolators
As in conventional cryptography, the security of the sys-
tem can be improved simply by assigning more bits to the
key. However, this implies further resource consumption. An
alternative, which oﬀers a tradeoﬀ with computational re-
quirements, is to employ higher-order interpolators. This ap-
proach can be connected to Shamir’s polynomial secret shar-
ing scheme [23].
From the basic idea in Figure 7, the interpolating filter
used is of a higher-order family. For illustration, we focus
specifically on the class of Lagrange interpolators [21]. Note
that such an approach has been previously applied for secu-
rity, for example, in Shamir’s scheme. However, there are a
number of diﬀerences. First, in Shamir’s approach, the se-
cret is hidden as a particular polynomial coeﬃcient, with
the remaining coeﬃcients being random. Moreover, there is
no implication of a sliding-window type of interpolation. By
contrast, the secret in the present paper is derived from a ran-
dom sampled value, once the complete polynomial has been
constructed. Second, the interpolation is applied sequentially
over a limited sliding-window of values. These two character-
istics make the implementation simpler and more appropri-
ate for a BSN.
A Lagrange interpolator essentially constructs a polyno-
mial PN (x) of degree N that passes through N + 1 points of
the form (xk, yk) and can be expressed as a linear combina-



















For a set of N + 1 points, it can be shown from the funda-
mental theorem of algebra that PN (x) is unique. Therefore,
the degree N of the interpolator used in secret sharing needs
to be one less than the number of available shares in order for
a secret to be properly concealed. This can be explained alter-
natively by Blakley’s related secret sharing scheme, which es-
sentially states that n hyperplanes in an n-dimensional space
intersect at a specific point. And therefore, a secret may be
encoded as any single coordinate of the point of intersection.
The construction for the present BSN context is as fol-
lows. For clarity, we illustrate the construction for a system
with memory length M = 3.
(1) In creating a new scrambled symbol, the focus is on
the values within a limited window including 3 previ-
ous values. In other words, there are 4 values of inter-
est at the current sampling index n, (t[n], x[n]), (t[n−
1], x[n − 1]), (t[n − 2], x[n − 2]), (t[n − 3], x[n − 3]),
where t[n] denotes the time value corresponding to
sampling index n.
(2) These values constitute the available shares and are
pooled together to construct a third-degree polyno-
mial, that is, P3(t) for the current window.
(3) A new secret share is created corresponding to a ran-
dom time value of tR ∈ TW , where TW represents
the current range of the window. The current share
(t[n], x[n]) is replaced with the new share (tR,P3(tR))
in the output signal.
(4) The construction moves to the next point similarly,
until the whole sequence has been processed.
The descrambling operation by a receiver proceeds se-
quentially in the reverse manner.
(1) Due to the particular design of INTRAS, at each in-
stant n, a total of M previous shares are available (in
the initial step, these are the virtual pre-symbols).
(2) Therefore, with an incoming new share, (tR, xd[n]),
and knowledge of tR provided from the biometrics, the
polynomial P3(t) for the current window can be com-
pletely reconstructed by the receiver.
(3) The original symbol or share (t[n], x[n]) can then be
recovered.
(4) This recovered share then participates in the next slid-
ing window. The process can thus be repeated until the
entire sequence has been recovered.
Due to the similar construction based on Lagrange in-
terpolators, the security of INTRAS is at least as good as
Shamir’s scheme for each sliding window. Furthermore, note
that a new random delay for a new secret share needs to re-
covered, from the biometrics, for the next sliding window.
Therefore, suppose a previous window was compromised, an
intruder would still need to repeat the process for the next
iteration, albeit the process is now easier, since at least M
shares of the required M + 1 shares have been previously
compromised.
While the application of INTRAS with higher-order in-
terpolation delivers improved security and flexibility, the dis-
advantage is a large increase in computational complexity, es-
pecially when the size of the memory M is substantial. There-
fore, a sensible strategy would be to apply linear interpolation
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Table 2: Performance of key generation and distribution at various coding conditions.
Parameters Without key fusion With key fusion
No. of subjects BCH Code No. of DET bits FRR (%) FAR (%) FRR (%) FAR (%)
24 (63, 45, 3) 64 15.6 0.02 14.7 0.02
24 (63, 16, 11) 64 4.5 0.02 4.2 0.02
24 (63, 16, 11) 32 4.7 0.03 4.4 0.02
40 (63, 45, 3) 64 17.1 0.03 16.6 0.03
40 (63, 16, 11) 64 5.1 0.03 4.8 0.03
40 (63, 16, 11) 32 5.3 0.04 5.0 0.03
for the links between weaker sensors, whereas higher-order
interpolation would be used for more capable sensors.
6. SIMULATION RESULTS
Even though the proposed methods should be applicable to
other types of cardiovascular biometrics, ECG-based bio-
metrics are the focus of performance assessment, since ECG
data are widely available in various public databases. In the
simulations, the ECG data, with R-R annotations, archived
at the publicly available PhysioBank database are used [14].
These signals are sampled at 1 KHz with 16-bit resolution. In
order to simulate the placements of various sensors in a BSN,
ECG records that include multichannel signals, recorded by
placing leads at various body locations, are specifically se-
lected. Since these leads are simultaneously recorded, timing
synchronization is implicitly guaranteed.
6.1. Key generation and distribution
Several key distribution scenarios, which are meant to illus-
trate the possible improvement in terms of communication
resources, as measured by the corresponding spectral eﬃ-
ciency, are demonstrated. Table 2 summarizes the simulation
parameters and resulting findings for a targeted 128-bit cryp-
tographic key.
The coding rate for error-correcting coding as well as
the number of bits used for channel error detection is var-
ied. Note that, compared to the single-point scheme, the
amount of information actually transmitted over the chan-
nel for key distribution is lower. The results illustrate that
the error-correcting stage is crucial. If key regeneration fails
at the receiver, then no amount of additional transmitted bits
can make a diﬀerence, since no error correction is performed.
On the other hand, if key regeneration is successful, then a
smaller number of bits only negligibly degrade the key veri-
fication. The results without and with key fusion are shown
for comparisons. Here, half of the key bits are derived from
the biometrics, while the remaining from an external source.
The performance metrics utilized for comparison are the
standard false rejection rate (FRR) and the false acceptance
rate (FAR) [4, 11]. In each case, we experimentally optimize
(by a numerical search) the Hamming distance threshold of
the DET bit sequence in order to give the smallest FAR, and
recorded the corresponding FRR. In other words, a mini-
mum FAR is the objective, at the expense of a higher FRR.
Note that this goal is not always appropriate; depending on
the envisioned application a diﬀerent, more balanced operat-
ing point, may be more suitable. In this case, the relevant op-
erating point is contrived instead for a particular application:
to supply the cryptographic key for a conventional encryp-
tion method. Evidently, for this scenario, if accepted as a pos-
itive match, the receiver-generated cryptographic key needs
to be an exact duplicate of the original key. Otherwise, the
conventional encryption and decryption procedure, which is
mostly an all-or-none process, will fail even for a single-bit
mismatch in the cryptographic key. This disastrous case is
prevented by imposing a very small FAR. Therefore, the re-
ported results show what can be correspondingly expected
for the FRR. A more tolerant alternative to data scrambling
is examined in the next section, where the feasibility of IN-
TRAS is assessed.
The results for the key fusion scheme show only a mi-
nor changes compared to key distribution from only the bio-
metrics. This is an indication that the biometrics are already
providing a good degree of randomness for key generation.
If this was not the case, the external random source (which
is forced to generate statistically reliable random keys) would
have resulted in significant improvement, since it would pro-
vide a much improved source of randomness for the key. But
according to the obtained results, only slight changes are ob-
served in the FAR.
6.2. Data scrambling
Using the MSE as a performance metric, Figure 9 shows the
results for INTRAS that combines two consecutive symbols
(M = 1) and a key sequence d[n] constructed from a 128-
bit key. In this case, the input symbols are simulated as an
i.i.d. sequence of integers, ranging from −10 to 10. The dis-
tortions are modeled using a simple additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel. Recall that, without any channel dis-
tortion, the INTRAS scheme can be summarized as follows.






with input x[n] and key sequence d[n]. The corresponding
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Figure 9: INTRAS data scrambling, with memory length M = 1.
To account for the channel distortion, the signal seen at the
input to the descrambler or receiver side is






where v[n] is the AWGN. The associated channel signal-to-










where E{·} represents the statistical expectation operator.
Depending on the key used for scrambling, there are 4
recovery strategies shown in the results. Let d[n], dBSN[n],
dnon-BSN[n], dnon-BSN-opt be, respectively, the original key se-
quence used for scrambling, a key sequence from a device in
the same BSN, a key sequence from an intruder outside of the
intended BSN, without and with key optimization. Then, the
four corresponding MSE performances, between the origi-
nal signal and the signal recovered using one of these key se-
quences, can be computed. For example, when the original








As shown in Figure 9, without knowledge of the key, the
signal recovered by an intruder diﬀers significantly from the
genuine signal. Moreover, an increase in the signal-to-noise
ratio does not lead to a significant improvement with an in-
correct key. By contrast, with the correct key, the receiver per-
formance improves as expected with better operating envi-
ronments. The gradual change in MSE is analogous to the
eﬀect caused by varying the degree of compression in a lossy
compression scheme.
Ideal key (from same sensor)
Correct key (from same BSN)
Incorrect key (without key optimization)
Incorrect key (with key optimization)
SNR (dB)












Figure 10: INTRAS data scrambling, with memory length M = 3
using Lagrange interpolation.
With respect to key optimization, there appear to be only
insignificant changes for the case with a correct key. How-
ever, with an incorrect key, there is a pronounced diﬀerence.
This is an indication of improved security. An intruder would
have more diﬃculty compromising a system with key opti-
mization.
Next, in order to further improve security (for the same
key length), additional processing cost is added by combining
4 symbols (with memory length = 3). As shown in Figure 10,
the additional processing not only helps further separate the
distinction of sensors inside and outside the BSN, it also im-
proves the performance at high-noise situation for the au-
thorized receiver. This is because each input symbol is now
contained in a wider window of output symbols, so that the
advantage of diversity is achieved.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, methods using biometrics for eﬃciently pro-
viding security in BSNs have been proposed. Two comple-
mentary approaches addressing, respectively, the key man-
agement issues and the fuzzy variability of biometric signals
are examined. One of the goals has been to allow for flexibil-
ity in each method. Depending on the actual application, a
system can be accordingly reconfigured to be best suited for
the required resource constraints. To this end, the proposed
methods have built-in adjustable parameters that allow for
varying degrees of robustness versus complexity.
While the proposed multipoint key management strat-
egy and the INTRAS framework have specifically targeted
relevant issues for a BSN, there remain important consider-
ations that need to be addressed for practical deployment.
Since a BSN is envisioned as a wireless network, the eﬀects
of channel fading and distortions should be considered. The
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robustness of the system needs to be evaluated in these prac-
tical scenarios. Furthermore, while the ECG and related sig-
nals have been touted as the most appropriate biometrics for
a BSN, there is of course a wide range of sensors and devices
that do not have access to the body’s cardiovascular networks.
Therefore, methods that allow for some form of interactions
and management of these devices need to be considered for a
BSN. In this manner, a BSN would be integrated more easily
into other existing network systems without severe security
compromises.
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